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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on the weakness of modern pay-as-you-
go social security systems in ﬁ  nancing pensions by taking a business and economic 
historical perspective on the issue. It focuses on Prussian Knappschaften (plural of 
Knappschaft), which provided miners with compulsory invalidity and implicit old-age 
insurance, and studies the period from 1854 to 1913. Knappschaften used the pay-as-
you-go mechanism, and, in the long-term, came under ﬁ  nancial pressure by the rising 
number of pensioners. The question to be answered is whether Knappschaften were 
able to oﬀ  er cohorts of miners entering the system at diﬀ  erent times the same implicit 
rates of return. Did Knappschaften provide an intergenerationally sustainable policy, 
or did adjustments of contributions and other parameters decrease the dividend for 
insured miners over time?
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: N33, N83, H53, H55
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It is often claimed that the ageing process that many industrialized countries have undergone 
for decades—and will continue to undergo—puts social security systems more and more 
under financial pressure. Under a constant policy, such as a constant income-replacement rate 
and a constant subsidy rate, this holds simply because double ageing affects the relation 
between the working and the non-working population. If social security benefits, pensions 
especially, are financed by the pay-as-you-go method (PAYGO) rather than being fully 
funded, changes in the pensioners-to-contributors ratio translate into increases in the 
contribution rate (Börsch-Supan, 1992; Febrero & Cadarso, 2006). The diagnosis may 
culminate in making the case for a system that is likely to burden future generations 
overproportionally because of its sensitivity to changes in demographic parameters. Thus, 
postponing financing burdens into the future, which the PAYGO system does, implies 
intergenerational redistribution that hurts future contributors and pensioners by reducing the 
implicit rate of return, which they can earn (Galasso & Profeta, 2004). For Germany, there are 
only a few recent studies that empirically assess implicit rates of return in the PAYGO system 
for different cohorts. Schnabel (1998), for instance, finds that rates of return decreased 
between 1930 and 1980 over cohorts; in an optimistic scenario, a single male born in 1930 
could expect a rate of return of 2.1 per cent, while a single male born in 1980 could expect a 
rate of return of -0.4 per cent. Evidence from Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001) also 
highlights decreasing implicit rates of return over time. Others claim that the problem is not 
how the PAYGO mechanism works—that there is no technical weakness at all. The problem, 
rather, is in the political economy of the system. Short-run oriented and vote-maximizing 
politicians, who ought to adjust the economy to long-run challenges, actually resist certain 
reforms (reducing the replacement rate, raising the legal retirement age, or neutralising 
adverse incentives to retire earlier). The bottom line is that policy makers are aware of 
PAYGO-related reform measures that would, among other things, take pressure off the 
contribution rate, but they choose not to implement them (Casamatta et al., 2000; Cremer & 
Pestieau, 2000; Galasso & Profeta, 2004; Galasso, 2008).  Another point of view is that it is 
all a matter of economic progess and productivity growth: If governments’ economic policy 
would create an environment that is investment- and innovation-friendly as well as 
competitive, and, perhaps, induce further economic activity by stimulating demand, 
industrialised countries should be able to eliminate the financing problems related to their 
social security systems (Concialdi, 2006; Wray, 2006).    
  4This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the weakness (alleged, perhaps) of 
modern PAYGO social security systems in financing pensions by taking a business and 
economic historical perspective on the issue. This undertaking has potential since the PAYGO 
pension insurance system has a quite long tradition, at least in Germany. Knappschaften 
(singular Knappschaft), the mutual insurance funds of German miners, provide the historical 
context for this paper.
1 In particular, I focus on the business history of all 103 Prussian 
Knappschaften, the most important, and comparatively best-documented funds. The study 
period covers the years 1854 to 1913, the formative period of the German welfare state.  
Because it was in 1854 that the miners’ Knappschaften took on the character of insurance 
funds thanks to liberal Prussian mining reform, this year seems to be a natural starting point. 
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Figure 1.   Average number of invalids and survivors per 100 contributors per Knappschaft. 
Note: Survivors are widows and orphans. 
Source: Ministerium für Handel und Gewerbe (1862-1915). 
 
 
What makes the Knappschaften an appropriate historical example?  What is the research 
question this paper wants to answer specifically by focusing on them? Concerning the first 
question, the Knappschaften insured miners against the major life risks—including sickness, 
invalidity, and survivorship—and granted sick pay and pensions as their main insurance 
  5benefits. One may argue that invalidity insurance is not old-age insurance and, thus, may not 
be subject to the same problems. However, I argue that this distinction does not matter in this 
particular case because both invalidity pensions and survivorship pensions were paid until 
death of the pensioner, hence implicitly insured them against longevity. Knappschaften used 
the PAYGO mechanism, and membership and payments of contributions were compulsory, 
with each Knappschaft having its own PAYGO equation to react on. They also accumulated 
reserves, but these were never sufficient to cover a substantial amount of the implicit 
liabilities. In fact, there is reason to conclude that Knappschaften were under massive pressure 
from a continuously rising proportion of pensioners, who were economically dependent 
individuals. Figure 1 conveys a first impression of what was going on. The average number of 
invalids (survivors) per 100 contributors per Knappschaft increased from about four (14) 
dependent retirees to 14 (more than 25), or by 357 (at least 181) per cent. 
Concerning the second question, this paper focuses on the extent to which the 
Knappschaften’s business policy might have been intergenerationally imbalanced in view of 
the pressure on the PAYGO equation illustrated above. The research question is: Did implicit 
rates of return, which were the dividends the Knappschaften paid their insurants, decrease 
over time? According to Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001), intergenerational balance may 
be achieved if implicit rates of return remain the same for each birth-cohort. Therefore my 
hypothesis is that the Knappschaften’s PAYGO system led to diminishing implicit rates of 
return, thus raising intergenerational redistribution to the detriment of future miners. This 
hypothesis refers primarily to the claim that the PAYGO mechanism is weak because of its 
general sensitivity to demographic changes in the broadest sense. Below, however, I will 
show that this framework can also link up with the two other claims described above: the 
‘political economy claim’ and the ‘growth claim.’  
This paper does not argue that the conditions in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries for Knappschaften were the same as for today’s industrialised economies’ social 
security systems. Since the Knappschaften were job-related, mining-specific factors were 
important sources of financial challenges (e.g., financial shocks due to massive accidents; 
structural decline of a mining area and, thus, exhaustion of resource deposits; and worsening 
geological conditions because of an increasing average depth). Nonetheless, the 
Knappschaften’s members might have also experienced increases in life expectancy, for 
instance, as did the population as a whole at the time. Indeed, this paper identifies a parallel to 
modern economies in the fundamental economic problem of adjusting finances via the 
  6PAYGO mechanism as a reaction to exogenous or endogenous shocks in the form of rising 
pensioners-to-contributors ratios. 
The Knappschaft is an old institution and a neglected field of research in business and 
economic history. Thus, telling a story about German Knappschaften may be a valuable 
undertaking simply because they remain an unknown piece of German insurance history.  The 
Knappschaften have significance as one of the job-related origins of Bismarckian-style 
compulsory health and pension insurance and—indirectly—of every related social insurance 
system today (Wagner-Braun, 2002, pp. 28-32; Bartels et al., 2009, Guinnane & Streb, 2009, 
pp. 4-9).  Astonishingly, however, the Knappschaften are quite absent from the English-
speaking literature.
2 For example, in his book The Origin of the Welfare State in England and 
Germany, 1850-1914, E. P. Hennock (2007) mentions Knappschaften only briefly. In its 
introduction to the historical evolution of pension systems, The Oxford Handbook of Pension 
and Retirement Income (Thane, 2006; Arza & Johnson, 2006) does emphasize the important 
role of the Bismarckian social legislation for today’s benefit systems, but treats the mining 
sector as some unspecified forerunner. Van der Linden (1996) deals with a wide range of 
mutual aid organizations, such as German Hilfskassen and Friendly Societies in Britain and 
abroad, but offers no information on Knappschaften.  
This paper does contain links to business history and the business history literature. To 
begin with, from a formal point of view, it uses firm-level data and, thus, assesses a 
problem—the sustainability of PAYGO systems—at the micro level that is usually, at least in 
my perception, understood as a problem mattering on the marcroeconomic level. What is 
more, Knappschaften were shaped to a considerable extent by government regulations, which 
converted them into a kind of job-related social insurance. The Knappschaften, however, were 
mutual insurance funds operating not for profit and independent of each other; and—this is 
probably the most important point—they imply collective solidarity. Though the quality of 
‘compulsory solidarity’ might have been different from that of pure voluntary solidarity, as in 
the Friendly Societies (Guinanne & Streb, 2009, p.10; Pearson, 2003, p. 51), this solidarity 
was going to be tested towards 1913. Hence, referring to Pearson (2002), for example, the 
Knappschaftens’ story might be seen as another case of ‘mutuality tested’, yet in a different 
insurance context. There is also a link with the story of English pit clubs (Benson, 2002). 
Benson argues that it was a general problem for those clubs’ solvency that they were tied to a 
particular mine and, thus, mine owner. The German miners’ Knappschaft system was 
different in that many funds covered a whole mining area and were, thus, arguably less 
  7exposed to the fate and interests of only one owner. Whether those larger funds could better 
maintain their solvency, however, must be determined empirically.   
The research question is answered in three consecutive steps. First, I sketch the history of 
the  Knappschaften from their beginnings in the mediaeval period (around 1260) to the 
Prussian mining reform, 1851-1865, followed by a basic description of how they were 
regulated. The latter, in particular, seems necessary because, as mentioned before, the German 
miners’  Knappschaften have been quite neglected in the (English-speaking) literature. 
Second, I analyse the quality of the Knappschaften’s exposure to financial challenges in more 
detail. Here, the focus on Prussian Knappschaften is justified for two reasons: i) Because 
Prussia was the core region of mining activity in the study period, it accounted for the vast 
majority of miners; and ii) the Prussian ministry of trade and commerce reported annually, 
beginning in 1861, the balance sheets and membership composition of all Knappschaften 
there (Statistik der Knappschaftsvereine des preussischen Staates, KV statistics hereafter). 
These data provide insights into the Knappschaften’s operation. Finally, as a third step, I 
present implicit rates of return for a number of Knappschaften and clarify their implications 
for intergenerational imbalance. 
The Knappschaften and their economic niche: industry-related insurance 
 
In mediaeval times, German miners relied on their own structures of mutual self-help in case 
of income loss due to injury, sickness and permanent incapacitation of the breadwinner (Lauf, 
2004, p. 115; Bartels et al., 2009, p. 197). Local associations of the Knappen, as miners were 
called at the time, were first founded in the Harz and Erz Mountains. In fact, these early 
associations fit well into the picture of emerging collective action in Western Europe (De 
Moor, 2008; Ogilvie, 2004). Contributions to the associations were voluntary and collected 
when they were needed, usually after an accident. Initially, there was not an established 
permanent reserve fund that was regularly refuelled. Benefits in the form of single payments 
were not high and were granted as charity. A legal right to be supported by one’s own 
Knappschaft (abbreviated by KV hereafter) also did not exist. Miners’ ‘social security’ 
mutualism, then, developed in several stages. Soon, members began making regular 
contributions (Büchsenpfennig) that were used to build up permanent reserve funds. Various 
local and regional mining codes enacted at the beginning of the fourteenth century 
strengthened compulsion and also often required the proprietors of mines (Gewerken) to share 
  8in the costs of sickness and invalidity claims. Hiltrop explains that owners often had to 
provide replacement pay for sick miners for four to eight weeks, while support for those 
permanently disabled came directly from the KVs (Brassert, 1858; Hiltrop, 1869; Karwehl, 
1907, p. 15-17). After the miners’ KVs had been incorporated into the absolutistic regime that 
emerged around middle of the sixteenth century, patronage by the sovereign became a 
substitute for miners’ fraternalism. Since it was a characteristic of the absolutist-mercantilist 
state to administer the exploitation of natural resources in every respect, miners and mine 
owners were, in fact, at the royal administration’s mercy (Kaufhold, 1994). It was during the 
eighteenth century that Prussia, with its hard-coal deposits, emerged as the new mining core 
region (Bülow, 1905, pp. 34-62; Bartels et al., 2009, p. 198; Tenfelde, 2004, p. 21).  In 
addition, Prussia’s mining legislation of 1851-1865 removed the absolutist-mercantilist 
economic order in favour of a more liberal economic framework, allowing mine owners a free 
hand in all business-related decisions and converting the KVs from charitable organizations 
into insurance providers. The state resumed the position of a passive supervisor (Brown, 
1995; Fischer, 1961a; Fischer, 1961b).  
The various German KVs of the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth 
centuries became mutual, non-profit insurance providers for mineworkers and also for 
employees in the related industries of steel production and ore processing. Although 
government regulations required KVs to act as social insurance funds, it is important to bear 
in mind that each KV acted on its own and never received state subsidies during the study 
period. Compulsory membership and, thus, obligatory contributions continued to be the 
practice in the mineworkers’ Knappschaften. In particular, following Wagner-Braun (2002, 
pp. 32-33), Knappschaft funds can be looked upon as the definite predecessors of statutory 
state insurance in Germany. In the study period, KVs in Prussia, and soon in almost all states 
of the German Reich (except, for example, Saxony), were regulated according to the 
Knappschaft law of 1854 (Friedrich Wilhelm IV., 1855), the Prussian general mining law of 
1865 (Klostermann, 1866) and the new Knappschaft law of 1906 (Steinbrinck, 1908). In 
practice, the Knappschaft’s funds had to fulfill various insurance functions.  
KVs had to be refounded in every area where mining and complementary economic 
activity, such as steel production and ore processing, took place. Table 1 shows how many 
Prussian KVs existed during the study period. In 1861, the first year for which the Statistik
der Knappschaftsvereine des preussischen Staates reported data, 71 KVs were in operation; 
this number increased to a remarkable 91 by 1870/1871. Then, due to mergers and closures 
and very few new entries, the number of KVs decreased to 62 in 1913. For illustrative 
  9purposes, Table 1 also reports the number of KVs in Bavaria, Saxony and the rest of the 
German Reich. Prussia consistently accounted for half or more of the existing KVs. 
 
 
Table 1.   Number of German Knappschaften, 1861-1913. 
      
Year Prussia  Bavaria  Saxony  Rest 
      
      
1861 71  n.a.  12  1 
1866 77  n.a.  12  1 
1871 91  n.a.  53  2 
1876 87  n.a.  53  6 
1881 83  n.a.  41  7 
1886 75  39  29  18 
1891 74  40  3  18 
1896 73  41  3  12 
1901 73  41  3  17 
1906 72  28  3  20 
1911 65  28  3  21 
1913 62  26  3  21 
      
 
Note: ‘n.a.’ is ‘not available.’ For Saxony, only the number of Knappschaft pension funds is reported. 
The ‘rest’ includes KVs located in the Kingdom of Wurttemberg, the Grand Duchy of Hesse, the 
Grand Duchy of Brunswick, the Duchy of Anhalt, the Duchy of Sachsen-Altenburg, the Duchy of 
Sachsen-Meiningen, the Principality of Waldeck, the Principality of Schwarzburg, and Alsace-
Lorraine. Compared to the data on Prussia, Bavaria and Saxony, official data on the rest are even 
scarcer; however, some data were located in the secondary literature, but have to be taken with 
caution. 
Source: Ministerium für Handel und Gewerbe (1862-1915); Oberbergamt München (1884-1915); 
Königliches Finanzministerium Sachsen (1870-1872); Königliches Finanzministerium Sachsen (1873-




The various Prussian KVs were located in so-called mining administration regions 
(Oberbergamtsbezirke). Figure 2 locates those regions: Bonn, Breslau, Clausthal, Dortmund 
and Halle. We can link mining administration regions with the production structure of the 
  10mining sector in Prussia. In terms of macroeconomic importance, hard coal stands out, of 
course. Dortmund comprised what were probably the single most important European coal 
fields at the time, the Ruhr coal fields, dominated by only a few large KVs. In the Breslau 
region, the important Lower and Upper Silesian coal fields were situated. The Saar and 
Aachen coal fields were located in the Bonn region. With respect to brown coal, the Halle and 
Clausthal regions comprised the main areas (Saxonian fields and Harz fields). The ores—iron 
ore as well as miscellaneous ores (copper, lead, etc.)—were extracted primarily in the Bonn, 
Clausthal and Halle regions. Consequently, KVs for related activities (steel production, ore 
processing) were situated there, too. Salt and stone extraction existed mainly in Bonn, 




Figure 2.   Location of the Prussian mining administration regions within the German Reich (around 
1871). 
Source: Bergamt Halle (1998), p. 29; Fürer (1988), p. 17; Oberbergamt Bonn, (1966), p. 22; Schelter 
(1992), p. 505-510; the map has been constructed by Nolan Ritter (RWI). 
  11Principally, we have to distinguish two different types of funds. The one, more frequently 
occurring, is the area Knappschaft (Bezirksknappschaft) that operated an insurance scheme 
contingent on the number and size of the mining enterprises located within the boundaries of 
its area. The other was the firm-related one (Werksknappschaft), usually situated within the 
area of another KV and, because of the linkage to a single company, comparatively smaller. 
Linking particular KVs to certain areas is somehow reminiscent of assigning territorial 
monopolies (such as the large German energy suppliers in the second half of the twentieth 
century). This is the more so because no KV could have had a subsidiary within another’s 
area. Consequently, competition was not seen in the free movement of services by KVs, but—
if at all—in the mobility of insurants.  
Each KV insured its members—miners and their dependants—against the financial 
consequences of the contingencies of life: injuries, sickness, invalidity, survivorship, and old 
age. The respective prescribed benefits included: (1) health care benefits for medical 
treatment and health resort attendance (usually provided for the family, as well); (2) sick pay 
for every day on leave; (3) an invalidity pension until death; (4) funeral benefits; (5) a 
widow’s pension until death or remarriage; and (6) and an orphan’s pension until the age of 
14. This article focuses, of course, on (3), leaving out the other benefit categories for the most 
part. Regarding the level of the invalidity pension benefit, KVs had a free hand in specifying 
amounts and calculation principles. The industry regulator did not even set minimum 
monetary standards or eligibility criteria.  The fact that KVs had so much room to maneuver 
explains most of the heterogeneity among them. Invalidity pensions predominantly consisted 
of a flat rate, varying in its level between KVs and interpretable as a minimum pension, plus 
build-up rates for each contribution period during employment (week, month or year). These 
rates often depended on the classification of the miner according to his length of service, 
wage, or occupation within the mine; build-up rates also varied across insurers. In particular, 
there is no indication that KVs directly indexed pensions, once granted, to price inflation or 
productivity; a miner receiving a nominal annual pension of 100 marks in one year would 
most likely have received those 100 marks also in the subsequent years.
4 Each KV could 
decide about eligibility rules autonomously. However, the widespread criterion to qualify for 
an invalidity pension was simply the inability to work as a miner, meaning that the miner 
could no longer earn one half of his actual wage in his occupation in the mining sector. In 
contrast, Bismarckian invalidity insurance (introduced in 1889) granted pensions if the 
employee was no longer able to earn one sixth of his average wage of the preceding five years 
and one sixth of the average wage in his particular job. Thus, the KVs’ eligibility criteria can 
  12be labelled, by and large, as comparatively less strict (Geyer, 1990; Frerich & Frey, 1993, p. 
100). Finally, survivors’ pensions were usually specified as a proportion of invalidity 
pensions (often 50 to 60 per cent for the widow’s pension and ten to 20 per cent for the 
orphan’s).  
Regarding revenues, KVs financed themselves mainly through contributions, but also 
through interest on assets and various fees (e.g., entrance, punishment, and marriage fees). 
They were allowed to charge a payment of contribution either as a fixed amount per 
contributor or as a percentage of labour income. We know from contemporary observers that 
KVs predominantly charged a fixed amount per period (week, month or year). This was either 
the same for every contributor regardless of individual characteristics, such as seniority, 
biological age, occupation within the mine (e.g., hewer underground or assistant worker at the 
surface) or wage class, respectively, or was scaled according to one or more of these 
individual characteristics. How a particular KV actually scaled contributions and dues was 
was decided only by the KV members’ representatives in self-management (and not according 
to what the mining administration might have wanted) and was published in the KV’s statute. 
However, this article does not use detailed KV-level information on scaling. Like compulsion 
and local organization of KVs, shared financing between mineworkers and mine owners had a 
long tradition, too. The law of 1865 prescribed that employers had to pay a minimum of 50 
per cent of the contributions mineworkers paid. Thus, financing was not necessarily on equal 
terms; the average firms’ portion of total contributions over all KVs was, thus, less than 50 
per cent. However, in 1906, the firms’ obligatory portion was increased to the same amount 
mineworkers had to pay on aggregate.  
Finally, the way the KVs self-management really worked in practice—thus how the 
parties involved influenced the decision-making process—is kind of a black box. Owing to 
the law of 1854, KVs were no longer run by state officials. Instead, each KV formed a 
managing board with an equal number of miners’ representatives and mine owners’ 
representatives. While the latter chose their representatives directly, miners chose the so-
called Elders (Älteste), who, in turn, elected miners’ representatives for the board. The Elders, 
who could have been active workers or retirees, were probably chosen by workers because of 
their prestige among the local membership.  Both the 1854 and 1865 laws allowed the Elders 
to elect ordinary KV members or even mining officials (private or state) to the board. It is a 
widespread theme of nineteenth-century writings, as well as of recent historical works, to 
claim that mine owners, via their representatives, constantly had relatively stronger influence 
in self-management. The miners’ chosen representatives were usually said to be friendlier 
  13toward their bosses—the mine owners—than to the miners they were elected to represent. The 
Elders, as intermediaries, are said to have made the difference in favour of a stronger position 
of employers in self-management (Tenfelde, 2004, pp. 26-33). According to Lauf (2006, p. 
272), it is not surprising that owners dominated the decision process effectively because they 
were the intellectuals. Heinrich Imbusch (1910, p. 63), who became the trade union leader of 
the Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter in 1918, stressed that many mine owners intended 
to use KVs to monitor and discipline their workforce: “Many employers saw in the KVs an 
instrument to pursue their own interests. The KVs’ and, thus, the workers’ interests had to be 
subordinated to owners’ intentions.”
5 Ferdinand Bertrams (1912, p. 1413) points to the fact 
that mine owners had an interest in establishing a settled—that is, immobile—stock of 
experienced miners. This makes sense, as working as a productive hewer at the time, and 
probably still today, required a learning-by-doing process; taking a young, inexperienced 
miner to his most productive level was, thus, a costly investment for the mine owner.  So, no 
mine owner would have been willing to develop a productive worker, only to lose him to 
another mine owner, which would have felt to him like an expropriation of future returns. 
I have not yet been able to locate source material on board meetings. Contemporary 
observers are also not very informative about how decisions on contributions and benefits 
were made and justified. However, we can be quite sure that KVs ran an expenditure-oriented 
revenue policy; that is, they specified, for a given time interval, the monetary level of benefits 
and formed in some (yet unknown) way expectations on aggregate claims costs, which were 
converted into an average contribution required; they also accounted for expected 
miscellaneous revenues and room for maneuver because of accumulated reserves. That is to 
say, we can assess how average contributions and average benefits were effectively adjusted 
from an historical perspective because we have the quantitative data from the KV statistics. 
What are harder to assess are the underlying ideas and the actuarial knowledge used.
6 
Having seen this basic information on the institutional design of the Knappschaften, we 
can now look at Table 2, which reports some more key data on Prussian KVs as a whole, 
highlighting secular trends in the study period. While the number of KVs decreased towards 
World War I, the total number of insurants—contributors and pensioners together—increased 
notably from 140,000 to 965,000, or by 3.78 per cent per year. As a measure of the KVs’ 
social significance, the share of total members in the German population is employed. 
Coverage increased from a mere 0.37 per cent to roughly 1.5 per cent; although this was not 
really high in the national context, it nonetheless increased, too. Moreover, the rising total 
membership in combination with a decreasing number of insurance funds implies that fund 
  14size must have grown increasingly large, on average. Here, I measure the size of a KV in 
terms of contributing miners exclusively. I thereby measure the true financing power a KV 
had by relying on a certain number of payers. Displayed are mean KV size and median KV 
size. Both measures are proposed in the literature as practical proxies for the minimum 
efficient size of an insurer (Eisen, 1991). Mean size increased from 1,675 contributors per KV 
to about 12,000, while median size increased only from 449 contributors per KV to 1,300. 
The difference between the two measures is a straightforward indicator of how skewed the 
annual KV size distribution was; here, it implies a right-hand tail. In particular, the relative 
frequency of small KVs persistently operating at small scale (below 500 contributors) always 
was at least 30 per cent per year. A contemporary observer, Harry Karwehl, emphasized 
retrospectively in 1907 (p. 71): “The German Knappschaft obviously suffers from cancer: It is 




Table 2.   Key data of Prussian Knappschaft funds, 1861-1913. 
                  
Year  Number of members    Fund size    Pension costs    Total assets 
                   
                   
 in  1,000 
persons 
in % of 
German 
population 
 Mean Median   in 
1,000 
marks 
in % of 
German 
NNP 
  in 1,000 marks 
                   
                   
1861  140  0.37   1,675  449   1,788  0.01    2,964 
1866  179  0.48   2,069  463   2,778  0.02    3,778 
1871  275  0.67   2,492  566   3,971  0.02    5,075 
1876  328  0.76   3,069  746   7,332  0.04    19,496 
1881 376  0.83    3,487  667    10,121 0.05    23,467 
1886 439  0.93    4,442  944    14,651 0.06    29,607 
1891 561  1.13    5,878  1,049    16,792 0.06    46,691 
1896 623  1.18    6,426  1,025    22,032 0.07    74,416 
1901 793  1.39    8,722  941    27,446 0.07    114,469 
1906 913  1.49    10,271 1,300    31,627 0.07    153,592 
1911 900  1.36    10,523 1,039    38,208 0.08    268,015 
1913 965  1.44    12,102 1,168    39,242 0.07    331,822 
                   
 
  15Note: ‘Members’ includes contributors and pensioners. ‘Fund size’ is measured in terms of 
contributors. ‘Pension costs’ include invalidity and survivorship pensions and are measured in 1913 
prices. ‘NNP’ is net national product. NNP and assets are also in 1913 prices. 
Source: Ministerium für Handel und Gewerbe (1862-1915) and Hoffmann (1965), pp. 599-601. 
 
The table, moreover, shows that real pension costs increased in absolute terms as well as in 
relation to real net national product (NNP); the latter observation implies benefit growth at a 
higher rate than that of the whole economy and, thus, tells of the prosperity in the German 
mining sector at the time. Before 1908, real total assets displayed relate to the KVs’ pension 
and sickness insurance sections together. Assets include cash reserves, bank deposits and 
fixed-interest- bearing papers.
8
The case for financial pressure 
 
The relevant regulations for KVs, the laws of 1854 and 1865, did not prescribe whether KVs 
should use the PAYGO method (Umlageverfahren) or funding (Kapitaldeckung). 
Contemporaries inform us that KVs used the former, thus converting in each year the 
contributions of working members into pension benefits for non-working invalids and 
survivors, while private life insurers concentrated on the latter (Caron, 1882, p. 7; Bertrams, 
1912, p. 1417; Köhne, 1915, pp. 18-19). It might have been that the PAYGO mechanism was 
appealing to KVs because it was easy to implement, and pensions could be paid immediately, 
so no prior capital accumulation phase per individual or generation was required. Besides that, 
both KV officials and contemporary observers might have been very optimistic about the 
long-term prospect of mining. Simons stated the following in 1895 (p. 13):   
 
KVs take care of accumulating an appropriate amount of reserves. The amount, an 
issue of debate, is not prescribed by law. Many KVs specified 150 marks per member. 
. . .  A fully funded system is claimed not to be necessary because mining in Germany 
will not decline any time soon, so that the finances of current and future generations 




  16In 1910, however, Imbusch (pp. 68-69) took a much more pessimistic perspective, especially 
on the lack of actuarial expertise in many KVs: 
 
Most Prussian KVs have not specified contributions and benefits according to 
actuarial principles; this would have enabled them to secure permanent solvency. 
Almost all KVs charged contributions too low and accumulated too little reserves. 
Total revenues often did not even cover total expenditures. . . . A number of KVs 
principally required a sufficiently high reserve, especially those whose mining areas 
might no longer experience prosperity or those on the verge of closure. Contributions 




The often-claimed sensitivity of a PAYGO system simply stems from the fact that a change in 
the relation between the number of pensioners and the number of contributors requires a 
proportional change in the contribution rate, other things being equal. This can be easily 
verified by a look at the stylized budget equation of a PAYGO system, which is 
 
           Contribution rate = (pensioners/contributors) * (average pension/average wage) * (1-a).         (1) 
 
Mechanically, the contribution rate depends on three factors: i) the pensioners-to-contributors 
ratio (PCR); ii) the gross pension level (ratio of average pension to average wage, GPL); and 
iii) the degree of subsidisation from the outside (Schmähl, 2001). KVs never received 
subsidies from the state or other KVs. Instead each KV, small or large, had financial reserves 
accumulated from past contributions, for example, that were charged ex ante but not required 
ex post to settle claims. To draw on reserves created in the past could help keep contributions 
and benefit levels constant, at least for some years.  
Let us have a closer look at the development of economic dependency—that is, the 
development of the KVs’ pensioners-to-contributors ratios. It seems reasonable here to take 
into account two facts that might have impliciations for the degree of adjustment pressure. 
The first is: KVs had three sorts of pensioners to support; invalid miners, widows, and 
orphans. Hence, it makes sense to distinguish between an invalids-to-contributors ratio and a 
survivors-to-contributors ratio simply because one invalid was usually twice as costly as a 
widow and six times as costly as an orphan. The second is: The long-term growth 
performance of KVs is ambivalent. Some were subject to long-term stagnation and shrinkage, 
while other funds prospered and grew; this was very probably so because each KV was tied 
  17either to one mining area, which could be subject to exhaustion and structural decline over 
time, or to the fate of one mining firm. Table 3 shows that of 103 observed Prussian KVs, 40 
exhibited a negative average annual growth rate during their whole operation in the study 
period. 63 KVs, in contrast, were quite dynamic in the long run and grew by at least 1.9 per 
cent per year. Note that size is measured here in terms of contributors; hence, ‘growth’ refers 
directly to an increasing number of financiers. In addition to showing long-term growth 
performance by the categories ‘stagnant’ and ‘dynamic,’ the table also shows that growth 
performance was obviously different—on average—for different KV sizes.
11 To distinguish 
between small stagnant KVs, small dynamic KVs and so on also enables us to assess the 
claim that sustained positive growth might improve things; actually, it is not the growth of the 
economy that is addressed here, but the idea that sustained growth in contributors helps keep 
financing problems to a minimum.  
 
 
Table 3.   Long-term growth patterns among Knappschaften. 
          
  Long-term growth pattern of Knappschaften 
   
          
Size class  Stagnant    Dynamic 
      
          
 Number  Mean  growth 
rate 
 Number  Mean  growth 
rate 
          
          
Small   (  < 500 contributors)  24  -5.52 % p.a.    16  1.88 % p.a. 
Medium   (  500-12,000 
contributors) 
15  -3.40 % p.a.    37  3.30 % p.a. 
Large (  > 12,000 contributors)  1  -2.97 % p.a.    10  3.64 % p.a. 
          
Sum 40    63  
    
 
Note: KV size is measured in terms of contributors. 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
 
According to combinations of long-term growth patterns and size classes (stagnant large is 
omitted because only one KV is involved), Table 4 displays the number of invalids per ten 
contributors per year (ICR) and the number of survivors per ten contributors per year (SCR), 
  18each averaged over the respective KVs. Obviously, the average burden with pensioners 
increased significantly. For example, the average small stagnant KV experienced an increase 
in the ICR (SCR) by about 1.8 (2.1) invalids (survivors) per ten contributors. Only small 
dynamic KVs seem inconsistent with the trend, at least with respect to survivors.       
Evidence on both the ICR and SCR as measures of the economic implications of 
increasing dependency define the agenda: Long-term adjustment was required. On the micro 
level, many KVs experienced social and biological ageing, while, on the macro level, it was 
not a severe problem for the German Reich towards World War I (see population pyramids in 
Rothenbacher, 2002, pp. 299-300). If KVs tried to react to the rising burden with pensioners 
by sharpening the eligibility rules— i.e., making it more difficult for insurants to qualify for 
an invalidity pension—they were not successful. KV-level evidence on institutional 
adjustments in that direction is rather scarce. Imbusch (1910, pp. 70-71), for example, 
mentions the Märkische KV, by far the largest Prussian KV until 1889 and the dominant one 
in the Ruhr, which, by 1880, tried to exclude retired miners from pension benefits if they were 
older than 36 when they started to work as a miner. What is more, geological conditions in the 
various mining subsectors underlying the KVs’ insurance might have worsened over time, 
causing thereby more injuries and fostering severe diseases. This could have offset gains in 
work safety.  
 
 
Table 4.   The economic dependency ratio as a measure of financial distress. 
                        
Year Stagnant  Knappschaften   Dynamic  Knappschaften 
      
                        
 Small    Medium    Small    Medium    Large 
               
                        
  ICR SCR  ICR SCR  ICR SCR  ICR SCR  ICR SCR 
                        
                        
1861  0.40 1.26  0.32 0.94  0.64 2.05  0.26 1.23  0.52 1.61 
1871  1.32 2.82  0.40 1.64  0.53 2.22  0.38 1.60  0.53 1.97 
1881  1.83 3.78  0.97 3.19  0.41 1.98  0.58 2.13  0.78 2.21 
1891  1.57 2.89  1.32 4.44  0.26 1.29  0.61 1.92  0.87 1.91 
1901  1.81 2.71  1.56 4.65  0.63 1.65  0.88 1.84  0.94 1.57 
1913  2.28 3.41  1.94 5.58  0.90 1.55  1.02 1.91  1.24 1.93 
                        
 
  19Note: ‘ICR’ (‘SCR’) denotes the invalids-to-contributors ratio (survivors-to-contributors ratio). Both 
ratios say how many pensioners of the respective category had to be financed by ten contributors. The 
ratios are averaged over KVs in year t. 
Source: See Table 2. 
 
 
Was a rising burden from pensioners a true problem or only a kind of illusion? I ask this 
because one might claim that there is an implicit relationship between the pensioners-to-
contributors ratio and productivity or wages, respectively (Verdugo, 2006). If the working 
members’ wages increased at a higher rate than did the contributions, an increasing 





































Figure 3.   Indices of average contribution, average benefit and net labour earnings growth for Prussian 
Knappschaften as a whole (1913=100). 
Source: See Figure 1; Hoffmann (1965), pp. 461. 
 
 
Figure 3 displays the development of indices of the average contribution, the average 
invalidity pension and the annual net wage in German mining. Two observations must be 
  20highlighted. Omitting fluctuations due to the business cycle, the indices of the annual wage of 
the representative miner and of the representative average invalidity pension follow a linear 
trend with nearly the same slope; the average annual growth of wages was 1.67 per cent, 
while that of the average pension was 1.79 per cent. Thus, the adjustment of the invalidity 
pension benefit was broadly linked to wages, even though with a time lag and not directly via 
the typical pension formula (see above). Moreover, the average contribution charged per year 
increased at a higher annual rate—by 2.78 per cent—implying that miners who entered later 
shouldered a comparatively faster-increasing portion of contributions. These two observations 
do not necessarily apply to a high number of KVs, but to a high number of miners. This is 
because contributions and pensions are size-weighted, and the size distribution of KVs was 
extremely skewed to the left with a long right-hand tail. 
What about the reactions to the widespread phenomenon of a rising burden from 
pensioners? To give an answer, Table 5 reports indices of the (non-weighted) average 
contribution rate and the (non-weighted) average net pension level (NPL) for combinations of 
long-term growth pattern and size class; absolute quantities are also given for the years 1861 
and 1913. In contrast to Figure 2, where Hoffmann’s wage series for the whole mining sector 
(including salines) was used, I try, as often as possible, to ascribe to each KV a wage series 
corresponding to the main product that was extracted in its area or by the relevant firm(s)  
(e.g., coal or ore), respectively. I use the Statistische Mitteilungen über die beim Bergbau 
Preußens gezahlten Arbeitslöhne und erzielten Arbeitsleistungen, a statistics framework 
reporting annual net wage by product and mining area (e.g., hard coal in the Ruhr, brown coal 
in the Harz region, and iron ore in the Mansfeld mining area). In addition, I use Banken’s 
(1997, appendix 5.4.2) wage series with respect to hard coal mining in the Saar and 
Holtfrerich’s (1973, pp.54-56) wage series with respect to hard coal mining in the Ruhr. 
Unfortunately, the official wage statistics do not report wage with respect to the related 
industries (smelting); therefore, I use Hoffmann’s wage series on foundries (1965, pp. 468-
470). What is more, the official wage statistics also do not report wages for workers in 
quarries and those employed in salt mining; here, I draw again on Hoffmann’s wage series on 
German mining as a whole. Not many KVs chose to specify a contribution rate rather than a 
fixed amount in marks per capita. However, knowing the average net labour earnings for 
miners enables us to convert the average contribution to a rate per year.     
In 1882, contemporary observer Albert Caron asserted: 
 
  21The fact that it is impossible to sustain high pensions with [such] low contributions is 
irrevocable. It seems reasonable for a KV to be able to grant smaller pensions that are 




Evidence in Table 5 supports this view. At the start of the miners’ insurance system, all KVs 
granted, on average, an NPL that was higher in the cases of small and medium stagnant and 
small dynamic KVs, even much higher than that in 1913. The NPL is an integral part of the 
PAYGO equation and can be interpreted as the income replacement of the pension benefit in 
the transition from the last year of employment to the first year of retirement (not to be 
confused with the lifetime replacement rate; see Whitehouse, 2006). For the time, a 
replacement rate of 26 per cent was extremely high. Note that in the Bismarckian invalidity 
insurance, the replacement rate persistently amounted to about 17 per cent before 1913 
(Frerich & Frey, 1993).
13 The obvious message of Table 5 is: KVs could not, on average, 
sustain what they had promised; even if the average pension in marks had been raised over 
time, the net pension level could not be kept constant. This is why it should not be surprising 
that small and medium stagnant, as well as small dynamic, KVs could afford to reduce the 
contribution rate over time—the NPL was reduced even more. It seems as if prospering 
medium and large KVs could keep their NPL adjustments moderate over time because they 
either raised or held the contribution rate constant, respectively. Here, a parallel to the 
‘political economy claim’ can be drawn. While there were no political forces implementing or 
blocking parametrical reforms (e.g., raising the contribution rate or raising the legal retirement 
age) or structural reforms (e.g., shift to funding), there were mine owners; they were the ones 
who arguably dominated the KVs’ boards and consequently the decision-making process. A 
contribution rate under pressure from a rising proportion of pensioners is a potential cost 
factor for mine owners—even more so if the owners’ profits were eroding due to diminishing 
output from mines near economic or technical exhaustion. An owner would arguably want to 
save costs in this situation, and contributions to the KVs were costs. In the absence of any 
constraint on parametrical reform (e.g., a politically guaranteed pension level, as in Germany), 
we observe that both the contribution rate and pension level served as the adjusting screw. 
Especially, the net pension level was decreased. This was, of course, not in the interest of old 




  22Table 5.   Indices of the average contribution rate and the average invalidity pension benefit 
(1913=100). 
                         
Year Stagnant  Knappschaften   Dynamic  Knappschaften 
      
                         
  Small   Medium   Small   Medium   Large 
           
                         
  ACR ANPL  ACR ANPL  ACR ANPL  ACR ANPL  ACR ANPL
                         
                         
Absolute values (%)                      
                         
1861  4.5 26.7    6.7 27.3    4.2 23.8    2.8 18.8    5.4 27.5 
1871  5.0 14.3    4.3 15.1    3.8 19.2    3.2 16.0    3.9 20.7 
1881  7.4  16.1  7.5  14.9  1.9  12.3  4.9  21.5  7.3  32.3 
1891  5.9  14.9  6.3  17.2  2.7  14.1  4.9  20.5  7.2  29.1 
1901  5.0  12.1  6.2  10.9  2.7  12.1  5.3  18.6  7.7  25.7 
1913  3.5  10.8  5.5  12.2  2.7  10.8  4.9  18.6  7.2  24.1 
                       
Indices                        
                         
1861  129  247   121  224   156  220  58  101  75  114 
1871  144  132  77  123   141  178  65  86   55  86 
1881  210  148   136  122  69  114   101  116   101  134 
1891  168  138   114  141   100  130   101  110   100  121 
1901  142  111   112  89    100  112   109  100   107  107 
1913  100  100   100  100   100  100   100  100   100  100 
                         
 
Note: The contribution rate per Knappschaft is calculated as ((average contribution/net wage)*100); 
the net pension level per Knappschaft is calculated as ((average invalidity pension/net wage)*100).  
Source: See Figure 1; Hoffmann (1965), p. 461 and 468-470; Banken (1997), appendix 5.4.2; 
Ministerium für Handel und Gewerbe (1885-1922). 
 
 
Caron tackled the question of what financial sustainability might be in the context of 
pension provision (again, it makes no difference for this matter that we focus on invalidity 
rather than old-age pension). Caron (1882, p. 19) substantiates his opinion: 
 
[A KVs’ respective performance] is not being able to finance pensions in some years. 
KVs are rather able to finance pensions at any point in time only if it is clear that they 
  23can always grant the same amount of pensions per capita. Otherwise, present 
pensioners would benefit to the detriment of future pensioners.
14 
 
There lies some truth in his assessment that is hard to deny: A pension system might be called 
sustainable if it ensures indefinitely that financing burdens are not transferred in either 
direction, from present to future or from future to present generations. However, there is also 
a misinterpretation in his assessment: It is not the absolute amount of the average pension that 
matters, but the replacement rate. In my perception, contemporary observers, and possibly 
KVs members too, did not see the difference; this is probably because they never formalized 
the PAYGO mechanism they were talking about. 
Finally, Table 6 displays the ratio of the miners’ and the mine owners’ payments of 
contributions. Again, this is done from the perspective of the average small stagnant KV, the 
average medium stagnant KV, and so on. This should give some indication of how financing 
burdens were shared between employee and employer. As mentioned in Section 2, miners and 
mine owners shouldered claims costs jointly, but not necessarily in equal amounts. Until 
1906, when financing on equal terms (50 per cent by each party) was introduced, employers 
usually covered a smaller portion of costs than insurants. In the long term, the miners’ portion 
of costs did not decrease much. While their portion was 26 per cent higher than owners’ in 
1861, their portion was still 15 per cent higher in 1907; the average small stagnant KV 
obviously could not induce employers to take on greater financial responsibility. In contrast, 
the average medium stagnant, as well as medium dynamic, KV significantly lowered the 
miners’ contributors relative to the employers’.        
 
 
Table 6.   Financing pension costs: the ratio of miners’ and employers’ contributions.  
           
Year  Stagnant Knappschaften    Dynamic Knappschaften 
      
            
 Small  Medium    Small  Medium  Large 
            
            
1861 1.26  1.74    2.07  2.29  1.20 
1871 1.22  1.62    1.46  1.92  1.18 
1881 1.21  1.55    1.43  1.88  1.08 
1891 1.22  1.49    1.70  1.47  1.09 
1901 1.25  1.28    1.65  1.42  1.10 
1907 1.15  1.24    1.65  1.26  1.10 
            
 
  24Note: The ratio is calculated as (total miners’ contributions/total employers’ contributions). 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
 
Not for profit, but not without dividend: Implicit rates of return 
 
In essence, the quantitative evidence presented above implies that KVs were broadly 
subjected to adjustment pressure owing to increasing system dependency. This state of affairs 
forced KVs to react according to the PAYGO equation. Whether fiscal adjustments were due 
to conscious and planned or accidental action, they had direct consequences for economic 
outcomes. The outcome of interest for this paper is the extent of intergenerational 
redistribution. Like a government, every KV faced an intertemporal budget restriction. Over a 
KV’s operating lifetime, discounted costs must have equalled discounted benefits and initial 
financial reserves. That is to say, present miners’ overconsumption of insurance benefits 
compared to what has been contributed constrains the amount of benefits consumable by 
future miners relative to contributions. From the point of view of a representative insured 
miner, changes in his KV’s business policy towards higher contributions or lower income 
replacement of the invalidity pension benefit must have necessarily had a direct impact on the 
dividend he could earn by being insured there. Paying contributions to the KV was an 
investment yielding either a positive rate of return, when lifetime invalidity pension benefits 
exceeded lifetime contribution payments, or a negative rate of return, when discounted 
contributions were higher than discounted pension benefits. Ideally, all insured miners who 
exhibited the same insurance history—that is, an equal number of years of contribution 
payments and years of retirement—but entered the KV in different years over the course of 
1861 to 1913, had earned the same implicit rate of return. According to our experience today, 
though, I expect to find that implicit rates of return fell over time.  
When it reads above that the KVs’ invalidity insurance and modern old-age insurance 
work the same way, this appears to be essentially correct. However, from a technical point of 
view, there is a difference that has to be mentioned. Invalidity could have occurred at any age: 
On the one hand, a miner could have entered the mining sector and a KV at age 25, have 
become disabled at age 30, and have received a pension for 20 years; on the other hand, a 
miner could have paid contributions for 35 years, have been unmarried, and have died before 
he qualified for a pension. These extremes constitute a continuum of many possible individual 
insurance histories. However, I have chosen to focus on one scenario that might be quite 
representative for the average insured miner: 25 years of service and contributions, followed 
  25by a five-year retirement period. For each KV that was in operation sufficiently long between 
1861 and 1913, I calculate the interest rate that leads to equality of discounted contributions 
and discounted pension benefits. This rate of return is calculated for three entrance cohorts: 
1861, 1871, and 1881. Because of the lack of data on age-specific contributions and age-
specific invalidity pensions, I calculate the simplest possible model. In this model, the 
representative miner pays in contributions per year that equal the average contribution 
computable from the KV statistics times the share of pension costs in all claims costs. The 
pension payment he receives per year is not indexed to increases in productivity—i.e., 
remains the same throughout his five years of retirement. Moreoever, rates of return are 
deflated with Hoffmann’s price index of consumer goods (1913=100) already used above. 
Regarding a particular KV, intergenerational redistribution to the detriment of later-entering 
cohorts occurred if rates of return diminished between 1861 and 1881; this is a within-KV 
comparison. It is important to note that this model is not really suitable for a comparison 
between KVs directly. However, if we found a great number of KVs to have provided 
diminishing rates of return over time for the representative miner, this should strengthen the 
general hypothesis: Regardless of whether KVs were growing or shrinking, more or less all of 
them faced an increasing burden from pensioners that led to decreasing returns for the 
representative insured miner.
15                   
Table 7 shows estimated implicit rates of return for 52 out of 103 Prussian KVs. In addition to 
the funds’ names and the rates of return, displayed in brackets is the number of full years of 
retirement a miner having entered in 1871 or 1881 must have additionally experienced in 
order to receive a rate of return that is not less than the 1861 cohort’s rate. This is an 
important piece of information because the straightforward model used does not itself adjust 
for gains in longevity; in my framework, I call this effect the longevity compensation. The 
information depicted in Table 7 needs careful interpretation because results were derived 
essentially on the basis of a statistical construct. The results, however, have several 
noteworthy implications. First, in comparison to entrance cohorts 1871 and 1881, the 
representative miner having entered in 1861 was extremely well-off in the majority of cases. 
This holds broadly across all long-term growth patterns. The variance is, however, lowest for 
the largest KVs. An initial real rate of return of 7.86 per cent (Halberger KV), for example, 
fits perfectly into the picture drawn in the previous subsection and matches contemporaries’ 
worries about solvency and sustainability (see the citations of Caron and Imbusch above).   
 
  26Table 7.   Real implicit rates of return per Knappschaft, selected entrance cohorts, 25 years of service, 
retirement period of five years. 
              
Knapppschaft 1861    1871   1881 
          
              
  Real IRR    Real IRR  Longevity 
compensation 
(full years) 
 Real  IRR  Longevity 
compensation 
(full years) 
              
              
Stagnant small KVs        
         
Eschweiler Pümpchen 
KV 
5.23 %    0.74 %  9  -0.15  %  9+ 
Halle Saline KV  0.42 %    0.93 %  -  -0.76  %  1
Hohenzollern KV  7.38 %    2.57 %  9+   -1.75  %  9+ 
Münster am Stein KV  -1.35 %    1.29 %  -  0.04  %  -
Rheinböller KV  10.35 %    6.20 %  9+   2.59  %  9+ 
Rothenfelde KV  -    -3.39 %  -  1.02  %  -
Sassendorf KV  2.92 %    -0.45 %  6  -3.58  %  9+ 
Werl KV  1.18 %    0.84 %  1  -1.28  %  3
Westernkotten KV  3.56 %    4.76 %  -  1.79  %  2
          
Stagnant medium KVs        
         
Brilon KV  4.43 %    -0.22 %  9  -0.42  %  9+ 
Deutz KV  6.06 %    1.44 %  9+   -2.63  %  9+ 
Eschweiler KV  1.66 %    -1.00 %  3  -2.12  %  4
Müsen KV  6.16 %    4.83 %  2  1.94  %  9+ 
          
Dynamic small KVs         
         
Cottenheim KV  -    8.82 %  -  7.02  %  3
Minden KV  3.74 %    -3.94 %  9+   -6.76  %  9+ 
Niedermendingen KV  -    -1.31 %  -  1.16  %  -
Stromberger Hütte 
KV 
9.41 %    8.62 %  2  6.58  %  5
St. Goar KV  9.49 %    5.72 %  +9   2.29  %  9+ 
Thüringen KV  -    1.36 %  -  3.50  %  -
Wittgenstein KV  12.33 %    6.79 %  9+   0.75  %  9+ 
          
Dynamic medium KVs         
         
Arnsberg KV  5.01 %    2.20 %  5  0.44  %  9+ 
Brühl KV  4.60 %    1.89 %  3  8.99  %  -
Burbacher Hütte KV  13.54 %    7.65 %  9+   4.75  %  9+ 
Dillinger Hütten KV  4.54 %    3.98 %  1   4.28 %  -
Eifel KV  5.99 %    1.88 %  9  -1.47  %  9+ 
         
   
 
At the beginning of their insurance era, KVs were very—perhaps too—generous; miners 
profitted from very modest contributions over 1861-1886 and comparatively high invalidity 
  27pensions by the end of the 1880s. Regardless of whether the absolute amount of invalidity 
pensions or the income replacement rates were in any sense sufficient to ensure subsistence, 
miners earned a high return on their invested contributions. This finding reflects, on the firm 
level, what is called the ‘first generations’ effect. 
 
Table 7.   Continued. 
              
Knappschaft  1861   1871  1881 
        
              
  Real IRR    Real IRR  Longevity 
compensation 
(full years) 
 Real  IRR  Longevity 
compensation 
(full years) 
              
              
Halberger KV  7.86 %    5.95 %  3  9.45  %  -
Heller KV  4.60 %    2.39 %  3  0.55  %  9+ 
Hostenbach KV  0.55 %    -0.14 %  1  -0.98  %  2
Mayener KV  -    9.60 %  -  5.32  %  9+ 
Neunkirchen KV  6.86 %    5.52 %  2  7.25  %  -
Olpe KV  4.61 %    1.82 %  4  1.16  %  5
Quinter KV  7.63 %    7.61 %  -  3.88  %  9+ 
Rheinischer KV  6.36 %    0.71 %  9+   -2.09  %  9+ 
Rheinpreussen KV  -    8.91 %  -  7.21  %  3
Siegen KV  5.50 %    2.30 %  6  0.70  %  9+ 
Stolberger KV  6.87 %    2.47 %  9+   0.74  %  9+ 
Wetzlar KV  4.56 %    1.48 %  5  -0.84  %  9+ 
Pless KV  -    4.96 %  -  5.69  %  -
Cassel KV  -    -0.20 %  -  -1.43  %  1
Georgs-Marien-Hütte 
KV 
-   9.85  %  -  5.23  %  9+ 
Ibbenbüren KV  0.63 %    -4.88 %  9+   -10.30  %  9+ 
Finowkanal KV  0.79 %    0.35 %  1   2.85 %  -
Lauchhammer KV  4.52 %    2.42 %  3  3.88  %  1
Rüdersdorf KV  4.67 %    3.11 %  2  -1.92  %  9+ 
Tangerhütte KV  8.32 %    5.19 %  7  6.21  %  3
          
 Dynamic large KVs        
         
Bochum Allgemeiner 
KV 
2.44 %    -0.81 %  4  -0.52  %  4
Clausthal KV  -    0.31 %  -  -4.26  %  5
Halberstadt KV  4.84 %    4.25 %  1  3.35  %  2
Mansfeld KV  5.24 %    5.61 %  -  2.85  %  4
Niederschlesien KV  4.43 %    2.83 %  2  3.14  %  2
Oberschlesien KV  4.16 %    2.36 %  3  1.33  %  4
Saarbrücken KV  2.39 %    0.79 %  2  -2.84  %  9+ 
         
 
Note: Size is measured in terms of contributors. Implicit rates of return (IRR) are rounded and in 1913 
prices.  
  28Source: See Table 2. 
 
 
Second, real implicit rates of return diminish for the majority of KVs and entrance cohorts 
1871 and 1881. However, there are KVs that even increased the rate over time (e.g., Münster
am Stein KV, Thüringen KV, Brühl KV, Halberger KV). The Brühl KV, one of the dynamic 
medium KVs, experienced the highest average annual growth rate of all KVs. Out of 39 
dynamic KVs, 11 managed to maintain a U-shaped pattern: rate for 1861 cohort > rate for 
1871 cohort < rate for 1881 cohort. Whenever rates of return diminished constantly over time, 
this implies intergenerational redistribution of financing burdens to the detriment of later or, 
respectively, future generations of miners. So holding the representative insurance history 
constant, especially the duration of retirement, the majority of KVs—regardless of their long-
term growth path and their size—could not maintain intertemporally stable rates of return.
16   
Yet in order to derive a more robust judgement of whether KVs redistributed financing 
burdens to future generations, we need to take the longevity-compensation information into 
account. The number in brackets in Table 7 tells us for how many additional full years a 
miner of the respective entrance cohort would have needed to receive his pension to realize a 
rate of return not below the reference rate of the 1861 cohort. Therefore, I try to take gains in 
longevity into account. In order to get an impression of the extent of gains in longevity, I refer 
to data on average pension duration. Unfortunately, these data are available beginning only in 
1900. As reference, I consider data on the largest KVs. Table 8 shows the average invalidity 
pension duration for those KVs for selected years, as well as the average change in that 
duration. In all but one case, the Halberstadt KV, the average annual change in the pension 
duration is positive over the period 1900 to 1913.  
Let us first have a look at the dynamic large KVs. Table 8 implies that the average pension 
duration in the first decade of the twentieth century is, for every KV, longer than the five 
years assumed in the model. For all but the Saarbrücker KV, it seems possible, looking back 
at 1871, that the representative miner could well have received a pension for the required 
additional years. This leads to the conclusion that the largest and fastest-growing KVs could 
well have maintained an intergenerationally neutral business policy. Hence, we can reject the 
hypothesis elaborated above with respect to this group of KVs. Obviously, taking gains in 
longevity into account, the solidarity of the large KVs does not appear to have been truly 
tested; their operations were quite sustainable. In particular, this evidence fits the ‘growth 
claim,’ but from a firm-level perspective.  
  29Table 8.   Average invalidity pension duration of the dynamic large Knappschaften, 1900-1913. 
        
  1900 1903 1906 1909 1913 Average  annual 
change in pension 
duration 
         
         
Allgemeiner KV Bochum  7.8  6.8  7.2  10.1  10.9  + 0.23 years 
Clausthal KV  8.0  10.0  8.7  9.0  11.0  + 0.23 years 
Halberstadt  KV  10.1 8.1  6.1 11.1 8.4  -0.13  years 
Mansfeld  KV  7.1 7.6 7.9 9.1 9.0  +  0.15  years 
Niederschlesien  KV  7.6 7.0 7.0 7.5 9.7  +  0.16  years 
Oberschlesien  KV  10.6 8.2  7.6 10.6  11.1  +  0.04  years 
Saarbrücken  KV  10.4 12.3 12.1 12.7 14.8  +  0.34  years 
         
 
Note: The KV statistics display the average invalidity pension duration in year t as the number of 
years, the invalids that died in that particular year, received their pension on average.    
Source: See Table 2. 
 
 
With regard to the KVs that did not maintain a U-shaped pattern, the longevity- 
compensation information indicates that they had redistributed financing burdens towards 
later generations of miners. Take, for example, the Rüdersdorf KV. It is not impossible from 
an ex post perspective that the representative miner of entrance cohort 1871 might have 
received two additional years of pension to experience the same rate of return as the 1861 
cohort.  However, it appears impossible that the representative miner of 1881 received a 
pension for additional nine years or more. Actually, the expression ‘9+’ says in most cases 
that a longevity compensation of more than ten years would have been necessary to treat the 
1861 entrance cohort equal to the 1861 entrance cohort. All the KVs facing such a calculated 
compensation are not likely to have maintained the same implicit rate of return over time. 
Interestingly, this finding holds for stagnant KVs as well as for dynamic small and medium 
KVs. This implies that sustaining the same rate of return was not only a matter of simply 
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This paper investigates the German miners’ social insurance funds, the Knappschaften, and 
their provision of members with pay-as-you-go invalidity pensions. The way they dealt with 
pension provision between 1854 and 1913 and the economic outcomes they produced have 
not yet been researched in detail. It has been shown that the miners and their employers, who, 
altogether, operated the mutual and non-profit funds, faced a fundamental economic problem, 
one that this paper assesses from a firm-level perspective: the rising relative burden from 
economically dependent pensioners.  This economic problem is nowadays often claimed to be 
the main challenge to modern welfare states. During the study period, pressure on finances 
forced the Knappschaften to adjust their fiscal policy, using a mix of raising contributions and 
lowering the pension level.     
The news here is that the nineteenth century Knappschaften’s business policy displays the 
general financial weakness of pay-as-you-go systems, but also the importance of growth. 
Evidence on implicit rates of return supports the conclusion that dynamic large KVs, the ones 
that operated the schemes in the most important and prospering mining areas (the Ruhr, 
Silesian, and Saar coal fields; the Mansfeld ore and Harz coal and ore fields), sustained an 
intergenerationally balanced policy in which differences in implicit rates of return between 
entrance cohorts by and large disappeared if gains in longevity are taken into account. In 
contrast, the majority of small and medium-sized KVs, regardless of whether they stagnated 
or grew in the long term, redistributed financing burdens intergenerationally towards the 
future. To say it in a pointed way: Since, at the start of the Knappschaftens’ occupational 
insurance system, initial generations of miners were able to capitalize on their membership 
more extensively than was reasonable ex post, later generations of miners paid the price in the 
form of reduced consumption possibilities. References to contemporary observers reveal not 
only their worries about these intertemporal distributional effects, but also their concerns 
about the long-term stability of the miners’ implicit intergenerational contract—thus about 
threats to solidarity. Thus, the problems with the PAYGO system that we usually attribute 
only to the modern, advanced welfare state of the second half of the twentieth century were 
already quite evident in the nineteenth century Knappschaften.  
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1. Still today, the Knappschaft is present as the second pillar of the German statutory old-age 
insurance. In 2005, the strictly occupational Bundesknappschaft merged with the 
Bahnversicherungsanstalt (social insurance for the railroad sector) and the Seekasse (health 
insurance for the shipping sector) into the Deutsche Rentenversicherung Knappschaft-Bahn-See 
(German Pension Fund Knappschaft-Bahn-See) (Bartels et al., 2009; Klenk, 2008, pp. 125-126). 
2. However, there is literature explicitly on Knappschaften: Guinnane & Streb (2009) mention it in 
their paper on moral hazard related to the Knappschaftens’ sick-pay benefit. An essay of Geyer 
(1992) provides an overview of Knappschaft history from the 1850s to the 1960s. Probably the 
most comprehensive historical account of the Knappschaft is Geyer (1989), which focuses on the 
period 1900 to 1945. 
3. The Bavarian and Saxonian governments also published statistics on Knappschaften. However, 
the Bavarian document is not of the same quality as the Prussian one, and the Saxonian 
Knappschaft system worked differently from Prussia’s and, hence, is not addressed in detail. 
4. For Germany, the change from static to dynamic pensions is, of course, an achievement of the 
pension reform of 1957 (Schlegel-Voß & Hardach, 2003). 
5. This is my own translation of the German original: “Hauptzweck der Knappschaftsvereine war 
vielen Arbeitgebern die Förderung ihrer Unternehmerinteressen. Ihrer Ansicht nach mussten die 
Interessen der Knappschaftsvereine und ihrer Mitglieder den Interessen der Werksbesitzer 
untergeordnet werden.“ 
6. Due to the law of 1906, a second self-management body was introduced, the general assembly 
(Generalversammlung), which was intended to elect the board members and to control the 
balance sheets (Lauf, 2006, p. 273). 
7. This is my own translation of the German original: “Ein Krebsschaden ist es, an dem das 
deutsche Knappschaftswesen offensichtlich krankt: die Zersplitterung in viele kleine Vereine“. 
8. Immovable property was excluded. 
9. This is my own translation of the German original: “Bei der Verwaltung der Vereine wird 
Rücksicht genommen auf Bildung eines angemessenen Reservefonds. Ueber die Höhe desselben, 
eine vielbesprochene Frage, bestehen keine gesetzlichen Bestimmungen. Viele Vereine haben 
den Satz von 150 Mark für jedes ständige Mitglied festgesetzt. […]. Die Hinterlegung einer 
vollständigen Kapitaldeckung hält man auch nicht für erforderlich, weil der jetzigen wie der 
kommenden Generation genügende Sicherheit geboten wird dadurch, dass der Bergbau in 
Deutschland nach menschlichem Ermessen in absehbarer Zeit nicht zum Erliegen kommen und 
daher wie heute, so auch künftig die Verpflichtungen gegen die ältere Generation mit Hilfe der 
Zahlungen der jüngeren Generation würden erfüllt werden können.“ 
  3210. This is my own translation oft he German original: “Bei den meisten preußischen 
Knappschaftsvereine waren von jeher die Beiträge und Leistungen nicht nach sachgemäßen 
Grundsätzen festgelegt, die die dauernde Sicherstellung der Leistungen gewährleisteten. Die 
Beiträge waren früher fast in allen Vereinen zu niedrig festgesetzt und die Rücklagen zum 
Reservefonds ganz ungenügend. Nicht selten reichten die Gesamteinnahmen mancher Vereine in 
einzelnen Jahren nicht einmal zur Deckung der Ausgaben aus. […]. Eine genügende Rücklage 
erfolgte nur bei einzelnen Vereinen. In manchen Bezirken war aber die Ansammlung erheblicher 
Kapitalien zur Sicherstellung der Leistungen unbedingt erforderlich, insbesondere dort, wo der 
Bergbau einer ungewissen Zukunft entgegensah oder gar de Rückgang resp. Die Einstellung des 
Betriebes in absehbarer Zeit vorauszusehen war. In der Regel aber dachte man: „Nach uns die 
Sündflut“, und hielt die Beiträge möglichst niedrig. Wenn dann die Kassen vor dem Bankerott 
standen und die im Statut vorgesehenen Unterstützungssätze nicht mehr gezahlt werden konnten, 
so wurde eben eine Kürzung derselben vorgenommen.“ 
11. I chose to define only these three size-class intervals because nearly all KVs easily fit into one of 
these three classes; regarding the entire study period, each KV was put in exactly one size class 
and remained in it.    
12. This is my own translation of the German original: “Die Thatsache, dass es unmöglich ist, mit so 
geringen Beiträgen wie bisher auf die Dauer so hohe Pensionen wie bisher zu gewähren, ist eben 
unumstösslich. Jedenfalls aber dürfte es besser sein, etwas geringere Pensionen mit voller 
Sicherheit für alle Zeit zu gewähren, als eine momentan günstige Lage dadurch zu erkaufen, dass 
man die Zukunft um so stärker belastet.“ 
13. The income replacement rate estimates displayed in Table 5 are definitely not comparable to rates 
that many present-day schemes, especially in the developed countries, provide; depending on the 
relative income position, the German system granted, around 1992, a net replacement rate of 
between 53 and 77 per cent (Börsch-Supan, 1992, p. 539). This observation can be explained by 
the fact that the concept of an individual’s lifetime as split into three stages—youth, employment, 
and retirement—had not really broken through in the nineteenth century, even not with 
Bismarckian old-age insurance. So, nineteenth and early twentieth century contemporaries may 
not have identified a pension as self-standing retirement income (because gainful employment 
during invalidity and family insurance had still played a major role) and, hence, had not 
advocated high replacement rates (Conrad, 1991; Hardach, 2003, pp. 6-7; Kaschke, 2000).    
14. This is my own translation of the German original: “Dieselbe [die jeweilige Leistungsfähigkeit 
eines KV, Anm. des Verf.] beruht nicht darauf, dass etwa in einem Jahre oder während einer 
Reihe von Jahren die dann gerade auszuzahlenden Pensionen aufgebracht werden können. Die 
Knappschaftsvereine sind vielmehr nur dann fähig, zu irgendeiner Zeit Pensionen in einer 
bestimmten Höhe zu leisten, wenn zugleich rechnungsmässig feststeht, dass sie stets die gleichen 
  3315. The data situation is quite good, but not optimal. The Prussian KV statistics offer a range of 
statistical information on KVs, but also lack some that are important for this paper. So, until 
1913, I lack data on the average age at which a miner first joined a KV and, until 1899, lack data 
on the average length of service, the average pension duration (number of years for which a 
pension was paid), and the average age at death of the invalidity pensioners. 
16. Not displayed are implicit rates of return for entrance cohorts 1886 and 1891 that allow especially 
for the effect of war and post-war inflation. Basically, rates fit into the picture since they are 
much lower for almost all KVs than rates depicted above. So, the secular trend of diminishing 
rates of return can be traced beyond the year 1913. 
17. A final note on widows’ and orphans’ pension is necessary. I have not taken them into account 
here. However, because of the fact that widows’ pensions usually made up 50 per cent of the 
invalidity pension, we simply have to double the longevity compensation in order to get an 
impression of how many years a miner’s widow had to receive her pension if her husband died 
after five years of retirement 
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